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Mass Evacuation Effects on Transportation:
A Comparative Analysis
Emily M. Jannace
Abstract
Mass evacuations have changed greatly in the past two decades. Evacuations such as Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, Florida
during Hurricane Irma, and New York during the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Irene have had significant
impacts on future mass evacuations in terms of transportation. This paper takes these methods and analyzes the best approach in given
situations based on volume capacity, impact, and cost to make recommendations that can be used by the three previously mention municipalities. With so many different techniques available, it is important to choose the one that moves the most people out of harm’s way
as quickly and effectively as possible while still being economical. Data from various transportation engineering professionals is used to
examine different techniques. Many of these papers have been published by Transportation Research Board. Additionally, a subject matter
expert interview was conducted with Dr. Scott Parr, Ph.D. from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Based on the research conducted, Emergency Shoulder Usage (ESU) is a superior option to contraflow. Fee suspension also has a
significant impact on areas with a low-income area. In areas where there was a switch from pretimed signal timing to semi-actuated or fully
actuated signal timing a better LOS during mass evacuations was seen. For the implementation of these techniques to be beneficial, resiliency is important and why the last recommendation calls for professionals to petition for better infrastructure and resiliency.

Introduction
Background
In 2005, 1.7 million people were evacuated from
Louisiana prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall
while another 150,000 to 200,000 remained due to a
lack of available resources needed to evacuate (Institute
of Medicine, 2007). Mass evacuation efforts rely heavily
on transportation.
Public transportation, personal vehicles, and
evacuation-specific transportation all affect the flow of
traffic and efficiency of the network. Evacuation efforts
are considered either “Notice” or “No-Notice” events.
A “Notice” event means there is at least 24 hours before
impact on the area, such as in an event of a hurricane
or Nor’easter. A “No Notice” event means that there is
less than 24 hours before the impact, or the amount of
time to evacuate the area would be longer than the time
left before impact, such as in the case of chemical plant
failure.
According to Parr and Kaiser, mass evacuations require
“improving traffic operations at critical intersections
[and] models that accurately emulate traffic congestions”
(Parr & Kaiser, 201, p. 62). All traffic modeling requires
trip generation, trip distribution, mode choice, and route
choice to be taken into account. When determining
mass evacuation procedures specific evacuation factors
2018/2019

must be taken into account such as cancellation of
transit, restriction of routes, and road closures (Parr and
Kaiser, 2011).
The effect these evacuations have on more
affluent areas is vastly different than lower income areas
within the same county. Lower income areas are more
likely to put a higher stress on public transportation,
whereas higher income areas are more likely to put stress
on the roadway networks using private or personal cars.
The main problem with evacuation efforts is the
uncertainty in both the event at hand and people’s
choices. The number of people that will evacuate
for a recommended evacuation is very different than
the number that will evacuate during a mandatory
evacuation. Some people already outside the evacuation
area will return to secure their belongings or retrieve
their friends and family unable to evacuate on their own.
Transportation systems need to be able to move people
out of harm’s way and yet be resilient enough to move
the people back into the area after the evacuation ends.
Statement of the Problem
Moving as many people as possible out of the path
of imminent danger is imperative. Evacuation efforts
need to be planned and prepared for well in advance.
These efforts need to consider population, geography,
topology, and economics. Techniques such as contraflow,
no tolling, and signal optimization are implemented
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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throughout evacuation efforts. Multiple escape pathways
need to not be impeded by barriers, such as construction
at the same time.
Traffic signals need to be optimized to allow for the
best Level of Service (LOS), lowest volume/capacity ratio
(v/c ratio), and delay time. Contraflow allows for bidirectional roadways to be partially reversed to allow for
twice as many lanes leaving the area in turn for no lanes
entering the area on that stretch of roadway. The removal
of fees allows for faster exiting of traffic on major
roadways with tolls and within public transportation
and also enables people who cannot afford to move
themselves or their family due to high toll prices or
public transportation fees to evacuate as well.

Mass Evacuation Effects on Transportation
A major limitation of this report was the lack of
raw numerical data. The data that was examined has
already been processed. Additionally, the metropolitan
New York area has only been affected with three major
evacuations (two Notice and one No-Notice). During
the previous two decades New York experienced major
evacuations during Hurricane Irene, Superstorm Sandy,
and the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks. Consequently, evacuation
results in this area are not as prevalent as other areas;
therefore, past evacuations such as Louisiana during
Hurricane Katrina and Florida during Hurricane Irma
will be analyzed. Each of these evacuations used different
methods to remove people in urban areas from the path
of danger using means available.

Purpose

Terms

The objective of this research is to compare the
different evacuation techniques for Notice and NoNotice Evacuation events. This report will make
recommendations that can be used by municipalities
such as New York City Department of Transportation,
Louisiana Department of Transportation, and Florida
Department of Transportation who require extensive
mass evacuation planning but does not address concerns
specific to each area. It will recommend evacuation
techniques with the highest output volumes and
lowest implementation and operational costs that
should be used and how resiliency should play a role in
infrastructure planning. Mass evacuations have major
implications on transportation patterns and require
studies to be conducted long before they are needed.
This comparative analysis paper focuses on this problem
and the best methods used to alleviate these problems
in the future. Transportation professionals strive to
make sure that systems will work in a resilient manner
and provide safe and cost-effective routes for the area’s
inhabitants.

LOS-Level of Service is the weighted average of the
control delay (delay that in incurred from a traffic light,
stop sign, yield sign, etc.) LOS is measured in seconds
and given a letter grade based on that. For signalized
intersections, a delay of 0-10 seconds has a LOS A and
is considered to be in free flow. A delay of 10-20 seconds
has a LOS B and stable flow with slight delays. LOS C
has a 20-35 second delay and is considered to have stable
flow with acceptable delays. A delay of 35-55 seconds
with a tolerable delay is LOS D. Unstable flow with a
delay of 55-80 second has a LOS E and a delay of greater
than 80 seconds with congestion and uncleared queues
has a LOS F. Typically a LOS C or better is considered
acceptable (HCM: Highway Capacity Manual, 2010).

Scope

TRB- Transportation Research Board is a part of
the National Research Council and conducts research
and provides research opportunities to professionals.
Research submitted and peer-reviewed are published in
the yearly journal.

This comparative analysis report will focus on specific
points that should be considered when examining mass
evacuations:
1. Types of evacuations (Notice vs No-Notice)
2. Contraflow
3. Emergency Shoulder Use (ESU)
4. Signal Timing Optimization
5. Fee Suspension
6. Resiliency of Infrastructure
2018/2019

v/c ratio-Volume/capacity ratio shows the intersections
overall ability to move the given volume through the
intersection based on its available capacity. A v/c ratio
below 0.85 is consider acceptable.
DOT-Department of Transportation

MTA-Mass Transportation Authority is the governing
body of the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation
District is lower New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. It operates the light rail and commuter
rails, buses, bridges, and tunnels in the region.
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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Research Methodology
This report focuses primarily on mass evacuations
in urban coastal areas of the United States, such as
New York City and Long Island. The research from
professionals at states’ department of transportation and
various contributions from Transportation Research
Board (TRB) was used for this report. Additionally,
research conducted by professionals at universities such
as University of Louisiana at Baton Rouge was examined.
These papers are all scholarly peer-reviewed articles
published in academic journals. They investigate signal
timing, contraflow, taxi rides, and subway trips and the
effects these evacuations had on these methods.
An interview was conducted with a subject matter
expert Dr. Scott Parr, Ph.D. of the Civil Engineering
Department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
who has degrees in Civil Engineering and Transportation
Engineering with specializations in Evacuation Planning
from universities such as University of Louisiana at
Baton Rouge and Florida Atlantic University. Dr. Parr
answered questions like the following:
1. What limitations have you faced from DOTs?
(3-second limitations on green time, etc…)
2. How do you approach evacuation methods
differently for Notice vs No-Notice?
3. What aspects of previous evacuations are
important in future planning and analysis?
4. Is contraflow typically used in both Notice and
No-Notice Evacuations?
5. In your opinion what is the best method of
evacuation?
This subject matter expert interview helps allow
for analysis of the data form an industry standard
standpoint. This research overall will allow for
municipalities to understand different mass evacuation
techniques than just the ones they currently use.
Search terms used during this research are listed
below. These terms allowed for comparative analysis of
different studies that were submitted to peer-reviewed
transportation journals including the Transportation
Review Board (TRB) for national implementation into
standard manuals such as the Highway Capacity Manual
(HCM.)

2018/2019

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mass Evacuation Effects on Transportation
No notice evacuation
Notice evacuation
Signal timing
Contraflow
Lane reversal
Hard shoulders
Emergency shoulder usage
Fee suspension
Resiliency
Hurricane evacuation (Hurricane Katrina,
Hurricane Irene, Superstorm Sandy)

Data Analysis
Types of Evacuations
Mass evacuations fall into two general categories,
Notice and No-Notice Evacuations. A Notice Evacuation
means there is a 24-hour time frame before impact.
This can mean until a hurricane makes landfall or until
a nuclear reactor or chemical plant reaches failure. A
No-Notice Evacuation means there is less than 24 hours
until impact will be felt, or it will take longer than that
to evacuate civilians. This can include a terrorist attack,
wildfire, or chemical spill.
There are various levels of evacuations as well such
as voluntary, mandatory, and forced. A voluntary or
recommended evacuation means that there is a threat
or the possibility of a threat to life, but it is not yet
imminent. A mandatory evacuation occurs when a
threat is imminent. People cannot be forcibly removed;
however, according to the City of Kenner in Louisiana
“all public services will be suspended during a mandatory
evacuation and those failing to comply with a mandatory
evacuation order shall not be rescued or provided with
other lifesaving assistance” (City of Kenner, n.d., p. 1). A
forced evacuation is more often seen during a chemical
leak where staying in place would definitely lead to
death. During a forced evacuation, emergency personnel
go door-to-door to advise people to leave immediately
and all public services are again suspended as in a
mandatory evacuation.
Since evacuations vary greatly on location and storm
intensity, states implement their own required public
notification times based on storm category. As seen in
Table 1, these times vary greatly from 9 hours for areas
less prone to flooding and with less coastline to 72 hours
for areas that are surrounded by areas prone to flooding
during storm surge.
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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Table 1: State’s Evacuation Time Requirements Based on Strom Category

Evacuation advanced notification time (in hours)
State

Category of the storm
1

2

3

4

5

Massachusetts

9

9

12

12

12

Rhode Island

12-24

12-24

12-24

12-24

12-24

Maryland

20

20

20

20

20

Virgina

12

18

24

27

27

South Carolina

24

24

32

32

32

Georgia

24-36

24-36

34-36

24-36

24-36

Mississippi

12

24

24

48

48

Louisiana

24

48

72

72

72

(Urbina & Wolshon, 2002, p. 262)

In past mandatory evacuations, such as the evacuation
of Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and
Texas during Hurricane Harvey in 2017, local news
reports such as NBC reported that residents refusing
to follow the mandatory evacuation order were “given
permanent markers and asked to write their Social
Security number, next of kin and a phone number on
their arm or across their abdomen” (Blome, 2005). This
was partially used as scare tactic to help persuade more
people to leave by showing them that they may end up
as a dead body that needed to be identified. This has
been seen in many mandatory and forced evacuation
scenarios since Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Harvey.
Methods of Evacuation
Contraflow
Contraflow takes “four-lane routes allowing the
reversal of two travel lanes” which leaves the entire
arterial traveling in a single direction rather than having
opposing flow (Florida Department of Transportation,
2005, p. 1). Contraflow allows for a theoretical
doubling of outbound volume capacity. As per Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT), “contraflow
operations only occur during daylight hours to ensure
safety” (Florida Department of Transportation, 2005,
p. 1). This leaves a limited amount of time to remove as
many civilians as possible from the impending threat.
Contraflow takes a considerable amount of planning
to implement. A microsimulation model needs to be
analyzed to help determine the best location to start and
end the contraflow corridor.
In a study conducted for the Florida Department
of Transportation, two main parts of evacuations
2018/2019

were determined to be the pre-positioning of vehicles
and the use of alternative routes. Pre-positioning
of vehicles means that “emergency vehicles may be
compelled to position themselves along the route at
certain interchanges to ensure reasonable response time
during contraflow operations” (Florida Department
of Transportation, 2005, p. 16). However, the prepositioning requires a larger number of emergency
responders to be available and on scene during an event
and will likely raise evacuation costs due to increase
in the number of hours needed to pay for emergency
responders. During Hurricane Irma in September 2017,
emergency responders and government officials cost
the tax payers a total of $5.2 million in overtime in
the Treasure Coast area of Florida (Gardner, Greenlee,
& Wixon, 2017). On the other side of the peninsula
in Key West, $1,972,553 in overtime was paid out
during Hurricane Irma (Filosa, 2017). This high cost

I-16 Paved Median Crossovers to Exit Contra-flow Lanes
(At Dublin, Georgia)
Normal westbound lanes

Paved crossover

End of contra-flow lanes
Figure 1: Prepositioned Crossover from Contraflow on I-16 in
Georgia (511 GA, n.d.)

commons.erau.edu/beyond
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to taxpayers did not include the costs of implementing
contraflow, emergency supplies, or the shutdown
of businesses that stopped bringing money into the
economy during that time.
Coastal areas frequently hit by hurricanes and that
often require evacuations have crossovers designed into
their highways. As seen in Figure 1, the I-16 in Georgia
has this implemented. Although these crossovers are
primarily used for mass emergency evacuations, they can
be used in other emergency situations such as during
a collision, fire, or area lockdown. These crossovers are
beneficial in more than just emergency evacuations;
they also help with the movement of emergency officials
during non-mass evacuations and the movement of
construction crews. Contraflow lanes come at a high
cost though. In 1981, it cost Houston $2.151 million
to implement a contraflow lane along I-45 (McCasland,
1981). Today that would cost approximately $6.145
million.
Contraflow may require emergency responders to
deviate to routes that “are close and approximately
parallel to the contraflow corridor” (Florida Department
of Transportation, 2005, p. 16). When examining an
evacuation route to impose contraflow on alternate
routes surrounding the area must also be examined.
Although it might be assumed that if contraflow was
being imposed that no one would need to travel in the
opposing direction, this is not the case. In the event of
an accident or medical emergency along the evacuation
route, emergency responders would need to move in

Mass Evacuation Effects on Transportation
the opposite direction. Supplies crucial to prepare for
the event need to be moved into the area; additional
responders such as EMS, police, National Guard, Army
Core of Engineers, and utility companies may need to
be moved into the evacuation area as well. Without the
ability to move these people and goods into the area in
a fast and effective manner, the likelihood for an even
more devastating loss to property and life increases
greatly.
Contraflow implementation may not be necessary
in all scenarios. According to subject matter expert
Dr. Scott Parr, contraflow is typically used only during
Notice Evacuations (personal communication, April
3, 2018). For hurricanes, “the hurricane’s strength,
its direction of travel, and the point of anticipated
landfall” are all considered pertinent to the decision
to implement contraflow or not (Florida Department
of Transportation, 2005, p. 1). Contraflow costs a
considerable amount of money to implement regardless
of where it happens. However, along different types of
arterials it would differ. Along a highway or parkway,
police presence would be more necessary at the start
and end of the corridor and at the entrance and exit
ramps along the reversed area. Along a turnpike where
intersections occur more often, a heavier police presence
is necessary to make sure conflicting movements do not
occur.
As seen in Table 2, the start and end of contraflow
operations are governed by different authorities in
different states. In most states the power to do so falls

Table 2: Authority to Impose and End Contraflow Based on State
Authority to start and end contraflow operations
State

Start

End

New Jersey

Governor

Governor

Delaware

Governor

Governor

Maryland

Local Emergency Management with the
State Police & Maryland DOT

Local Emergency Management with the
State Police & Maryland DOT

Virgina

Governor

Governor

North Carolina

Governor

Governor

South Carolina

Governor

Department of Public Safety

Georgia

Governor in conjunction with Georgia
DOT and GEMA

Georgia DOT

Florida

Governor

Highway Patrol

Alabama

Alabama DOT

Alabama DOT

Louisiana

Governor

Governor

Texas

High Patrol Captain in Corpus Christi

High Patrol Captain in San Antonio

(Urbina & Wolshon, 2002, p. 269)

2018/2019
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on the governor; however, in some states the DOT,
highway patrol, or local emergency management team
can decide. These agencies must decide when to enact
contraflow conditions to help move the greatest number
of people out of harm’s way while still making sure it is
economically feasible to do. Even if the governor is solely
in charge of making that call s/he will still coordinate
and seek advisement from the state’s DOT and from
emergency management officials.
A difficulty in microsimulation modeling is often the
data, and when examining the data from Hurricane
Katrina this was evident. Future evacuation analysis that
need to be done to determine contraflow conditions
for future evacuations require this data to be ran, but
the data was already reduced and had considerably
variabilities that should be examined. Raw data must
be reduced and then quality assured and corrected by
removing any outliers. When examining the contraflow
volumes during this evacuation an increase in volume
was seen; however, on Friday, August 26 there was a
New Orleans Saints games and the increase was minimal
enough that despite the emergency declaration made
“the slightly elevated volumes at this location have been
suggest to be associated with a New Orleans Saints
football game that was played that evening” (Wolshon,
2008, p. 41). To determine if this should be considered
an outlier or not traffic data patterns from a similar date
when there was a game in years past should be examined,
as well as, traffic patterns at that location in years
following the hurricane.
Another major part of contraflow modeling is trying
to determine the number of vehicles that will be
evacuating. The average household has 1.10-2.15 cars
and will take multiple cars with them when evacuating.
These people travel from 67 to 132 miles to evacuate,
some even out of state (Wu, Lindell, & Prater, 2012).
This can be difficult to model when more evacuees than
expected leave in their personal vehicles (Kim, Shekhar,
& Min, 2008). These vehicles may include personal
cars with or without trailers, RVs, and motorcycles. The
use of trailers and RVs would increase the heavy vehicle
percent and thus decrease the overall LOS of an arterial.
This causes problems in microsimulation modeling
due to the uncertainty in both number of vehicles and
vehicle type which both play major roles in analysis.
According to subject-matter expert Dr. Scott Parr,
the biggest problem with contraflow is that it does
not remove the bottleneck but rather pushes it further
upstream. The way to eliminate this is to provide one
2018/2019
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side of the highway for one direction and the other
side of the highway for an alternative route (personal
communication, April 3, 2018). This means that signs
and the relaying information to drivers is even more
important than with normal contraflow conditions
because once these drivers enter the highway there is no
changing their mind. One side of the highway would
continue in a northbound or southbound direction and
the other side of the highway would continue in an
eastbound or westbound direction.
Emergency Shoulder Usage (ESU)
As alternative to contraflow is the use of the shoulder
that runs along the arterial as an additional lane. This
is commonly known as a hard shoulder when being
implemented for Emergency Shoulder Usage (ESU).
Hard shoulders are pre-paved into the roadway geometry
for this purpose and striped with blue lane markings.
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration (FHA), “shoulders
provide refuge for vehicles in emergency situations,
access for first responders, and additional recovery for
drivers trying to avoid conflicts in the adjoining travel
lane” (n.d.-b). The benefits these shoulders provide
are crucial and are why the FHA requires a minimum
shoulder width in highway design (Federal Highway
Administration, n.d.-b). Typically, lane width is no
smaller than 10 feet wide.
The argument for ESU rather than contraflow is the
reduced cost and more mobility in start and end points.
Hard shoulder implementation does not require “traffic
cones, barriers, signs, and arrow boards to alert motorists
of the closure and operations” (Florida Department
of Transportation, 2018, p. 12). Hard shoulders cost
money to implement on existing roadways. Many
shoulders and the bridges over them need to be
reconstructed or widened. Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) analysis is also important. Maintenance
costs to implement their use include police presence,
roadway maintenance, driver training, and ITS (Florida
Department of Transportation, 2018). However, these
costs are much lower than those needed to implement
contraflow.
Hard shoulders require less microsimulation
modeling. Microsimulation with an additional lane
takes considerably less time and money to do than to
remodel a corridor for contraflow conditions. The use
of hard shoulders is becoming more prevalent than the
use of contraflow due to the ease in analysis that it has in
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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Figure 2: Emergency Shoulder Usage (ESU) verse Contraflow (Jin, 2017, p. 4)

preparation efforts and cost.
Hard shoulders allow for the easier movement of
supplies such as food, water, and fuel into the evacuation
area by not cutting off critical routes into the area. A
major benefit of using a hard shoulder according to
FDOT is the “reduced number of law enforcement
personnel required to support ESU” (2018, p. 17). This
allows for their expertise to be used in other areas such
as storm preparedness and vehicle collisions that occur
during evacuation procedures.
During Hurricane Irma, many evacuees were upset
that contraflow was not being implemented but they
did not realize that use of hard shoulders was having
the same effect. According to subject matter expert Dr.
Scott Parr, “60 percent of roadways in Florida were
considered uncongested.” This meant they had a LOS
A, B, or C. “Most evacuees did experience at least 30
minutes of LOS F at which they did not move or only
moved slightly followed by LOS A for the remainder of
the hour averaging LOS C” (personal communication,
April 3, 2018). The use of ESU also helped to reduce the
amount of time required until it could be implemented
because conflicting travel did not need to be flush from
2018/2019

the arterial (Ballard & Borchardt, 2006). This meant
that more evacuees could move throughout the system
before the storm hit.
Figure 2 shows how hard shoulder use is different
than contraflow. Contraflow has only one way to
be implemented where both sides of the arterial are
traveling in the same direction. Alternatively, ESU has
three different methods of how it can be implemented.
This includes outside shoulder running, inside shoulder
running, and both shoulder running. According to Parr,
inside shoulder running is much easier on an arterial’s
movement; however, they are harder to find. Outside
shoulder running although more popularly seen does
cause issues when it comes to traffic exiting and entering
the arterial (personal communication, April 3, 2018).
When implementing ESU into arterials in the future
municipalities should analyze the use of interior shoulder
and the cost benefit to implement it.
Fee Suspension
Another way to help with the movement of evacuees
out of the area of danger is with fee suspension. This
includes highway and bridge tolling and fees related
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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Table 3: Fees for Main Methods of Evacuation
Out of New York City
Location

Fees

Bronx-Whitestone, Throgs
Neck, RFK, Hugh L. Carey,
QMT

E-Z Pass $5.76
Toll by Mail $8.50

Verrazano-Narrows Bridge
(only entering Staten Island)

E-Z Pass $11.52
Toll by Mail $17.00

Henry Hudson

E-Z Pass $2.64
Toll by Mail $6.00

Cross Bay and Marine Parkway
Bridges

E-Z Pass $2.16
Toll by Mail $4.25

Light Rail and Buses

$2.75

Express Bus

$6.50

Commuter Rail

$6.25-$29.25

(Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), n.d.-a)

to the use of public transportation. Fee suspension has
become a standard since Hurricane Katrina (S. Parr,
personal communication, April 3, 2018). The issue with
fees not being suspended is in areas where the tolls to use
these arterials or fares for the public transportation can
be very expensive. People in evacuation areas who cannot
afford these fees can see this as a reason not to evacuate.
As seen in Table 3, tolls in New York City can be as
high as $17 one-way. Although light rail, buses, and
express buses have reasonable fares they are per person
compared to per vehicle and these modes can only take
a person within the city limits or to other boroughs that
most likely will also be evacuating. To move completely
out of the city a commuter rail is necessary which has
considerably higher one-way fares per person.
The high cost of public transportation affected
Louisiana’s evacuation for Hurricane Katrina. Although a
plan was made it was not implemented to help the lowincome areas that are reliant on public transportation.
This was in part due to the timing of the storm and
to notice that was given to the residents to evacuate.
Although the storm hit as expected the real destruction
came when the levee broke without notice. Low-income
areas are found in flood prone locations. It becomes
difficult to use public transportation such as buses when
the roads have already begun to flood.
Evacuation costs can be extremely high per household
especially in low-income areas. Although more than half
of evacuees tend to go to the households of family and
friends not in the evacuation area, others go to hotels
2018/2019

or shelters. To evacuate to a hotel costs a household on
average approximately $470. A shelter costs a household
approximately $144 and even when evacuating to
friends and family the cost is approximately $174
per household. The costs include lodging, food,
entertainment, travel costs, and time (Whitehead, 2003).
According to FEMA, these costs are not refundable
unless the home is deemed to be too damaged to return
to (FEMA, n.d.). For many who do not take the warning
to evacuate seriously, these costs are not worth it.
In Florida, “most toll operators have a policy of
suspending tolls during hurricane evacuation for
general purpose traffic,” and for “relief workers during
the recovery phase” (Ballard & Borchardt, 2006, p.
37). The removal of tolls helps to keep traffic moving
efficiently particularly for those without a toll pass so
that queues do not form at the toll plaza and slow down
the evacuation process. The suspension of tolls was also
put into place to allow for evacuees to “more easily be
able to prepare for any potential storm impacts, access
important hurricane supplies, and quickly and safely
evacuate when necessary” (Governor Scott’s Office,
2017).
Another example of fee suspension was during the
aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in October-November
2012. Following the storm’s landfall, the subway system
run by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA) did not collect fares for the first two days (Zhu,
Ozbay, Xie, & Yang, 2016). This helped to move people
back into the city and return people to work in the
Central Business District to help restart the economy.
Signal Timing
Signal optimization is important in every day
conditions and even more so during mass evacuations.
Most cities still use pre-timed signal timing. This means
that depending on the time of day the major arterial has
a set amount of time and the minor arterial has a set
amount of time. During these times any protected turns
(a turn with no opposing traffic) or permitted turns (a
turn allowed while opposing traffic has the ability to
be present but is not) occur. During mass evacuations
semi-actuated or fully actuated signal timing plans are
much more important. Semi-actuated and actuated
intersections use detectors to determine cycle lengths.
In semi-actuated signal timing plan detectors are only
used on the minor arterial. At fully actuated intersections
detectors are used at all approaches to determine when
to change the direction of flow. Large cities such as New
commons.erau.edu/beyond
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York use pre-timed signal timing due to the fact that
they have the lowest operational costs. According to
Parr and Kaisar, “these cities represent targets of terror
attacks.” Their pre-timed plans can “slow evacuation
times resulting in further loss of life and property” (Parr
& Kaisar, 2011).
Although optimizing signal timing is an important
feature for mass evacuations, sometimes it still does
not do enough during No-Notice Evacuations. Instead
flash mode is used to help keep traffic moving on the
major arterial (Niloy & Fries, 2018). A flashing yellow
light acts as a yield and a flashing red light acts as a
stop. There are three types of flash mode commonly
used. They include flashing yellow on the major arterial
and flashing yellow on the minor arterial, and dynamic
flashing yellow. Dynamic flashing yellow helps to flush
the minor arterial. It involves a flashing yellow on the
major arterial while the minor arterial has a flashing red
signal. The major arterial then gets a solid red light while
the minor arterial gets a green light for a short period of
time. It then returns to the flashing yellow and flashing
red (S. Parr, personal communication, April 3, 2018).
By implementing these features an increased number of
vehicles can be moved through these intersections that
have high saturation rates and even higher v/c ratios.
Resiliency
Resiliency has become an extremely important and
heated topic in politics and is often times the topic
of debate following a mass evacuation. According to
Hesaslip et al., “resilience is defined as “the ability for
the system to maintain its demonstrated level of service
or to restore itself to that level of service in a specified
timeframe” (as cited in Zhu et al., 2016). Resiliency can
be broken down into four phases: normality, breakdown,
self-annealing, and recovery. The goal of resiliency is
to maintain normality or a full functioning system and
to get through recovery or the restoration of system
infrastructure and service as fast as possible. Most
systems see a breakdown or disruption and reduction
of system performance on the regular. It is when selfannealing or when users of the system attempt to find
alternative route or travel modes that there is a problem.
This causes the entity to lose money and puts a stress on
other modes of transportation.
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy took a toll on the New
York City subway system resulting in “minor delays for
the evacuation, significant work deterioration after the
hurricane impact, and disruption that took more than
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five days to recover from” (Zhu et al., 2016). In the two
days following the storm only 14 of the 23 subway lines
were active putting stress on those subway lines, buses,
and ferries.
In 2011, Hurricane Irene only disrupted the subway
system for two days which included the storm time and
the time it took for ridership to return to normal levels.
Hurricane Sandy took the entire network off-line for
three days and took ten days for ridership to return to
normal levels (Zhu et al., 2016). To date there are still
subway lines, stations, and tunnels closed due to the
effects of these two storms.
After Hurricane Sandy, the MTA stated they would
need $300 million dollars in repairs for the Long Island
Railroad (LIRR) system alone. This included restoration
to substations, switches, signals, and the third rail
(MTA, n.d.-b). These infrastructure repairs are still
influencing service six years later. The LIRR is constantly
seeing signal problems and delays due to the failing
infrastructure that was only made worse by Hurricane
Sandy.
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 in New York City cost
$10 million in infrastructure damage (Sanchez, 2001).
Nowadays, that infrastructure lost would cost the city
$14.168 million. After the attacks subway lines, roads,
bridges, and buildings in the area had to be inspected
for their ability to operate while still being structurally
sound before being permitted to reopen. The attacks
caused repairs to be needed for 1,800 feet of the N/R
and 1/9 subway lines’ tunnels costing $1.7 billion dollars
in repairs. During that time $245 million was lost in
revenue (McCall, 2001).
Without resilient infrastructure, storms and terrorist
attacks can not only damage the infrastructure but
also debilitate the local economy due to the high cost
of repairs and the loss in revenue entering the area.
Although, the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks decreased the
volume of people entering the area to conduct business
and take part in leisurely activities. In the months
following this tragedy, the inability of those who were
still entering the areas to get there using the N/R and
1/9 subway lines was important. The 9 subway line
ran directly under the World Trade Center and was
extensively damaged after the attacks. Service was
suspended following the attacks for a year for the system
to be rebuilt in that area.
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Conclusion
Although each mass evacuation is different in what it
requires and its timeline, all evacuation planning calls for
the same goal. The goal of any evacuation is to remove
as many people as possible in the shortest amount of
time, while doing so at the lowest price and in the safest
way before the threat arrives. Since so many different
techniques are used for the different types of evacuations
scenarios it is important to thoroughly examine them.
All the techniques examined had both benefits and
drawbacks. The recommendations that have been
made are believed to be the best techniques to aid in
most major mass evacuations. They help to remove an
increased volume of evacuees by shortening the queue,
decreasing delay, and making the overall LOS better.
The implementation of ESU will help to increase
outbound capacity while still allowing emergency
responders into the threat area and minimizes cost when
compared to contraflow. Signal optimization using semiactuated or fully actuated signals help to time the signals
based on demand. Flash mode helps to reduce delay
time by having a near continual flow of vehicles on the
main arterial and then flushing the minor arterial. Fee
suspension helps to move even low-income members of
the community out of harm’s way and then back into
the area later. Overall, a call for resilient infrastructure is
the most important part of mass evacuations. Resilient
infrastructure aids in the ability to move people out of
the threat area before impact and then back into the area
to begin restoration after the threat has passed.
Recommendations
Transportation engineering for mass evacuations has
many parts to it. Based on the research done for this
report the following points are being recommended to
the municipalities for future planning and analysis of
mass evacuations.
Implementation ESU as an Alternative to Contraflow
Based on the research examined, ESU is just as good
of an option as contraflow during Notice Evacuations.
Both help to increase the network capacity and achieve a
better overall LOS. The fact that ESU has a much lower
cost to implement than contraflow makes it a better
alternative in many cases. ESU could also be used during
No-Notice Evacuations because it does not require a
great deal of planning since a portion of roadway does
not need to be closed and flushed of opposing traffic,
and an exponential increase in police presence is also
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not needed. It is recommended that in future analysis of
evacuation corridors it should be examined if shoulder
use is possible and where it is to be implemented. When
municipalities are looking to redo roadways or create
new ones they should be advised to add an ESU if they
are in evacuation prone regions.
Suspend Fees on Public Transportation
The implementation of fee suspension on public
transportation like that following Hurricane Sandy was
the boost to get people back into the Central Business
District that New York City needed to help start its road
to recovery. Although fee suspension on highways and
bridges became common following Hurricane Katrina
fee suspension on public transportation is not as widely
used as seen following Hurricane Irene. Fee suspension
can help to save numerous lives by moving people out
of the threatened area particularly those in low-income
areas. This helps to increase the timeline for evacuation
and for recovery. Fee suspension does cost money
because services are being ran and no fees are being
collected, but it does cost a very minimal amount of
money to implement the halting of toll collection.
Change to Semi-Actuated or Fully Actuated Signal Timing
Areas prone to evacuations should investigate
switching over to semi-actuated or fully actuated signal
timing plans as opposed to pretimed signal timing plans.
Even though the overall cost is higher to implement
it helps considerably with emergency evacuations, as
well as, with daily traffic operations and capacity. The
increased cost could be justified, and the implementation
could happen over an extended period of time to help
defer the costs. Intersections deemed most important to
evacuation operations could have actuators installed first
and those deemed less important later down the line.
This technique helps to remove an increased volume of
evacuees by shortening the queue, decreasing delay, and
making the overall LOS better.
Call for an Investment in Resilient Infrastructure
Resiliency is by far one of the most important aspects
of evacuation planning. Transportation professionals
and local municipalities should be continually calling
for more resilient infrastructure following so many
of these major storms and terrorist attacks. Without
resilient infrastructure moving people back into the
area following the threat becomes even more difficult.
It also adds millions of dollars of work that will need to
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be done to repair infrastructure damaged by storms that
could have been prevented with more sound systems and
roadways.
Although these techniques come with a high upfront
price tag, they help to reduce the overall cost of
evacuation and to move an increased number of people
out of the threat area leading up to the threat and back
into the area during recovery.
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Appendix I
Subject-Matter Expert Interview with Dr. Scott Parr, Ph.D.
An interview with subject matter expert Dr. Scott Parr, PhD was done in person on April 3, 2018. Dr. Parr is a
Visiting Assistant Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Dr. Parr has a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree
in Civil Engineering from Florida Atlantic University and received his Ph.D. in Civil Engineering from University
of Louisiana at Baton Rouge. His dissertation focused on mass evacuations. Currently at Embry-Riddle he teaches
Introduction to Transportation Engineering, High-Speed Rail Design, and Traffic Data Collection and Analysis.
1. In your opinion what is the best method of evacuation?
It depends primarily on geographic size and population. For Florida, a large-scale evacuation uses hard shoulders
nowadays. In Louisiana, all their plans are set for contraflow so that is all they will use. Contraflow gives more
capacity. Traffic engineering relies solely on supply and demand. Hard shoulders are placed on roadways for
evacuation purposes. They are stripped with blue lane markings. Right shoulder use causes a problem with on- and
off-ramps and can lead to accidents. Left shoulders are better but are much harder to come by. Hard shoulders only
give 1 additional lane compared to contraflow which gives 2-3 extra lanes and thus more capacity. Contraflow only
moves the bottleneck and doesn’t get rid of it if the opposing sides remerge at the same point. This can be eliminated
by making the northbound lanes continue going north for example continuing on I95 to Savannah and the
southbound lanes merge west for example to I10. No tolling is now a standard to prevent state liability post Katrina.
2.. What limitations have you faced from DOTs? (3-second limitations on green time, etc.)
In the early years there was much more push back but since Katrina there is virtually none. FDOT is very good
and LaDOTD is amazing.
3. How do you approach evacuation methods differently for notice vs no notice?
The main thing is the departure curve. No-Notice Evacuations are typically smaller scale. Congestion is typically
not a problem. It is a timing issue. The best method is public transportation such as trains and subways. However, in
the event of something like a terrorist attack these can be compromised as well.
4. What aspects of previous evacuations are important in future planning and analysis?
Katrina was an amazing evacuation from a traffic stand point. The problem was people in the city who did not
have the means to evacuate. There was a plan created but never enacted for moving the low-income people who
relied on public transportation. State governments and federal governments now allocate a considerable amount
of money for this after that. For Irma most of Florida evacuated 72-48 hours before landfall. There really were no
problems with it. 60% of roadways were considered. People would sit in traffic not moving at LOS F for 30 minutes
and then move at LOS A for the next 30 minutes. The hard shoulder helps to increase overall speed and LOS.
5. Explain dynamic flashing yellow.
The main road has flashing yellow and the size road flashing red. The main road turns to solid red and the side
road to green. Then goes back to flashing yellow and flashing red. The point is to help flush out the side road.
6. Is contraflow typically used in both Notice and No-Notice Evacuations?
Typically, just Notice because there is not enough time to plan during No-Notice Evacuations.
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